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25X1A

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	GENERAL				
<b>1.</b> 25X1A	COCOM controls on ship sales may break down:				
2581A	The American proposal in COCOM for temporarily maintaining the current quota controls on sales of ships to the Orbit has in effect been rejected, according to the United States delegation. Furthermore, the American-British proposal for revised controls, featuring a maximum combined quota of 150,000 gross tons per year for all COCOM participants, was blocked by the Danes on 23 June.				
	Within the past week COCOM has been apprised of 33 recent or contemplated ship deliveries to the Orbit from five participating countries, involving about 100,000 gross tons. The German delegate emphasized to his American colleagues privately on 28 June that Bonn considers that COCOM shipping controls have broken down; he doubts that his government can much longer resist pressure from shipbuilders to fill Orbit orders.				
	Comment: The failure of the COCOM working level to reach agreement on quota controls for any important itemssuch as shipsadds to the almost impossible task facing the Consultative Group at its forthcoming meeting which may be postponed from 8 to 21 July. This meeting had been expected to wind up the review of the whole controls program.				
	SOVIET UNION				
<b>2.</b> 25X1Å	USSR announces opening of atomic power station:				
	The USSR Council of Ministers has announced the opening on 27 June of an atomic electric power station. The plant has a 5,000-kilowatt capacity, is powered by "the nuclear fission of the uranium atom," and is producing current for neighboring industry				

and agriculture. Development work is in progress for similar plants with from 50,000 to 100,000 kilowatts capacity.

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Comment: The low power of this unit indicates that a developmental or pilot installation is being described. This Soviet claim does not necessarily mean that problems involved in the economic production of large amounts of nower from

the Soviet Academy tion of power from timing of the offici action to what the with the "Atomic F	ive been solved y of Sciences atomic energy al announceme USSR consider:	l. President A recently stated in the USSR w nt may therefore an American	. N. Nesme that large- as a long ware reflect So intention to	eyanov o scale ger ay off. T oviet re-
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·	SOUTHEAST ASIA	
25X1A	6. Ngo Dinh Diem will not form government without French pledge to defend Tonkin:	
	Ngo Dinh Diem stated emphatically to the American chargé in Saigon on 29 June that he would not form a government unless assured that the French would defend Tonkin. He explained he had no intention of taking office merely to	t
	sign a capitulatory peace.	
	Diem said his urgent request to General Salan not to evacuate southern Tonkin had been turned down on the ground that Salan had received explicit instructions from Paris to withdraw from this area. Diem asked that American diplomatic pressure be brought to bear on the French to reverse this policy, but did not appear to expect armed American intervention.	
	Comment: It will be difficult if not impossible to form an authentic Vietnamese nationalist government which will agree to the abandonment of Tonkin. The formation of a "Cochinchina Republic," now advocated by certain French officials, might attract a handful of Vietnamese opportunists, but would be even less popular than a provisional partitioning of the country which left open the hope of eventual unification.	l
25X	7. Impending clash between French and Cambodian policies on American aid:	
	The American chargé in Phnom Penh reports that the Cambodian government is making plans in the expectation of	

direct American military aid and training, whereas the French have no intention of permitting such a program.

The chargé observes that if the Cambodians are not soon given a proper understanding of the limitations to American involvement in their affairs, their present good feeling toward the United States could be quickly reversed.

Comment: The apparent French decision not to defend Tonkin will make the Cambodians all the more eager to obtain direct military aid from the United States.

25X1A	8.	Comment on Chou En-lai's visit to Rangoon:			
		The joint statement issued on 29 June by Chou En-lai and Burmese prime minister U Nu paralleled the Chou-Nehru declaration only in pledging nonaggression and noninterference in each other's affairs. The lack of any reference to the desirability of "unified" states in Indochina suggests that Chou was unable to persuade Burme's interest.			

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# **NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

9.	
25X1	AUS base:
	The Turkish minister to Libya, who accompanied Libyan prime minister Ben Halim on his recent visit to Ankara, has told the American counselor in Benghazi that the Turks have advised Libya to settle for a "reasonable offer" for use of the American basepresumably more than the offered \$2,000,000 annual paymentand rely on American good will for future economic aid.
	The counselor understands that the Turks tried to persuade Libyan prime minister Ben Halim not to threaten the United States by demanding immediate evacuation and challenging the present interim base agreement if Libya's exorbitant requests for economic aid are not met.
	Comment: Earlier statements by Ben Halim and the Libyan minister of defense suggested that Libya would threaten to abrogate the interim base agreement, initialed in December 1951 just prior to Libyan independence, in a final effort to obtain annual compensation of as much as \$7,000,000 for an American base agreement.
	The Turkish foreign minister has told Ambassador Warren that he believes a "slight increase" in the current offer of \$2,000,000 annually might satisfy the Libyans. This attitude on the part of the Turks, whose advice is much respected in Benghazi, may encourage the Libyans in their belief that the present offer is inadequate.
	WESTERN EUROPE
25X1A <b>10.</b>	French premier says he may request conscripts for Indochina:
	Premier Mendes-France told Ambassador Dillon in Paris on 29 June that he was in- clined to favor asking the National Assembly

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for permission to use conscripts in Indochina. He added that the government would have to decide on this issue before the end of the week.

The premier said that he did not know whether he could pick up enough votes on the right to counter probable Socialist opposition to this policy. He told Dillon that there is a difference of opinion on the subject among the military and that Marshal Juin has taken a firm position against it.

Assembly would most likely not grant authority to use conscripts in Indochina, Mendes-France is probably only making a gesture to satisfy both American opinion and those Gaullists who favor a strong Indochina policy. He is anxious to elicit greater American support for his government, including a specific statement limiting Communist expansion.